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Base de données des enseignements et séminaires de l'EHESS

In the first part of this course (F. KOESSLER, 12 hours) we start by reviewing central theoretical tools and results that are essential to study interactive decision situations with asymmetric information. Then, we focus on different approaches to information design in games and mechanism design depending on whether (i) there is a benevolent mediator (third party) or not; (ii) the mediator is omniscient (perfectly informed) or not; (iii) information is hard (certifiable) or soft.

Keywords: Information structure; Bayesian games; contracts and commitment; mediation; correlated and communication equilibria; revelation principles; Bayesian persuasion; information design; cheap talk; disclosure of certifiable information.

The second part of this course (O. Tercieux, 24h) will be devoted to the studey of market design theory. Market design seeks to offer practical solutions to various resource allocation problems. Economists working in this field have recently analyzed and reorganized professional labor markets such as those for medical interns or for public school teachers, as well as “markets” for assigning students to publicschools, for exchanging kidney donors with medical incompatibilities among transplant patients… The course will present the theory of market design and its applications in two parts.

1. An important constraint encountered in many real-world allocation problems is that monetarytransfers are limited or unavailable; for instance, public school seats and human kidneyscannot be traded for money. The first part of this class will cover the theory of market design when no monetary transfers are allowed. We will put a particular emphasis on applications toreal world problems such as the assignment of public school seats to students, of socialhousing to agents, of kidney to sick patients, of teachers to schools...

2. The second half will cover the theory when monetary transfers are allowed. There will besome lectures on the basic theory and classical results, but we will try to focus on newermaterial and open questions arising from applications such as search ad auctions, allocation ofgovernment resources such as radio spectrum (FCC),…

As a general goal, we will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, andthink about whether they can be improved based on a mixture of theoretical, experimental, andempirical methods.