Cet enseignant est référent pour cette UE
S'il s'agit de l'enseignement principal d'un enseignant, le nom de celui-ci est indiqué en gras.
http://www.master-ape.ens.fr/-agendas-des-cours-.html
The fundamental welfare theorems establish the perfectly competitive case as a benchmark for thinking about outcomes in market economies. In particular, any inefficiencies that arise in a market economy, and hence any role for Pareto-improving market intervention, must be traceable to a violation of at least one of the building assumptions of the perfectly competitive case. The analysis of these market failures is the topic of this course.
The course consists in three main parts. The first part covers classical market failures without informational concerns: public goods, externalities and market power. It introduces basic results and serves as an introduction to any further course in public economics and in industrial organization.
The second part focuses on uncertainty and the formalization of information in a standard microeconomic context: decision under uncertainty, information structures, competitive equilibrium under uncertainty, incomplete markets. This part is a necessary step in order to address issues of asymmetric information and it serves as an introduction to any further course in finance and insurance theory.
The third and most important part is devoted to the study of informational imperfection and asymmetries as a source of inefficiencies. Starting from the failure of the competitive equilibrium paradigm in a context of informational asymmetries, it first presents central models of transaction under asymmetric information, the so-called Principal - Agent models. Moving to interactive situations with multiple agents, the course then provides an introduction to mechanism design, with applications to auctions and public good provision, and a discussion of implementation.
Ce séminaire est donné en anglais.
Cours de 36 h de CM + 24 h de TD, 6 ECTS.
Suivi et validation pour le master : Spécial : cf. le descriptif
Intitulés généraux :
Renseignements :
mentions APE et PPD, secrétariat pédagogique, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, tél. : 01 80 52 19 43/44. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez écrire à master-ape(at)psemail.eu
Réception :
du lundi au mardi de 15 h à 17 h 30 et du jeudi au vendredi de 10 h à 12 h 30.
Adresse(s) électronique(s) de contact : master-ape(at)psemail.eu
Dernière modification de cette fiche par le service des enseignements (sg12@ehess.fr) : 19 juillet 2017.